Nginx + PHP CGI的一个可能的安全漏洞

现在普遍的Nginx + PHP cgi的做法是在配置文件中,　通过正则匹配([Nginx(PHP/fastcgi)的PATH_INFO问题]())设置SCRIPT_FILENAME, 今天小顿发现了一个这种方式的安全漏洞.

比如, 有http://www.laruence.com/fake.jpg, 那么通过构造如下的URL, 就可以看到fake.jpg的二进制内容:

http://www.laruence.com/fake.jpg/foo.php

为什么会这样呢?

比如, 如下的nginx conf:

location ~ \.php($|/) {
	fastcgi_pass   127.0.0.1:9000;
	fastcgi_index  index.php;
	set $script    $uri;
	set $path_info "";
	if ($uri ~ "^(.+\.php)(/.*)") {
		set  $script     $1;
		set  $path_info  $2;
	}
	include       fastcgi_params;
	fastcgi_param SCRIPT_FILENAME   $document_root$script;
	fastcgi_param SCRIPT_NAME       $script;
	fastcgi_param PATH_INFO         $path_info;
}

通过正则匹配以后, SCRIPT_NAME会被设置为"fake.jpg/foo.php", 继而构造成SCRIPT_FILENAME传递个PHP CGI, 但是PHP又为什么会接受这样的参数, 并且把a.jpg解析呢?

这就要说到PHP的cgi SAPI中的参数, fix_pathinfo了:

; cgi.fix_pathinfo provides *real* PATH_INFO/PATH_TRANSLATED support for CGI.  PHP's
; previous behaviour was to set PATH_TRANSLATED to SCRIPT_FILENAME, and to not grok
; what PATH_INFO is.  For more information on PATH_INFO, see the cgi specs.  Setting
; this to 1 will cause PHP CGI to fix it's paths to conform to the spec.  A setting
; of zero causes PHP to behave as before.  Default is 1.  You should fix your scripts
; to use SCRIPT_FILENAME rather than PATH_TRANSLATED.
cgi.fix_pathinfo=1

如果开启了这个选项, 那么就会触发在PHP中的如下逻辑:

/*
 * if the file doesn't exist, try to extract PATH_INFO out
 * of it by stat'ing back through the '/'
 * this fixes url's like /info.php/test
 */
if (script_path_translated &&
	(script_path_translated_len = strlen(script_path_translated)) > 0 &&
	(script_path_translated[script_path_translated_len-1] == '/' ||
....//以下省略.

到这里, PHP会认为SCRIPT_FILENAME是fake.jpg, 而foo.php是PATH_INFO, 然后PHP就把fake.jpg当作一个PHP文件来解释执行... So...

这个隐患的危害用小顿的话来说, 是巨大的.

对于一些论坛来说, 如果上传一个图片(实际上是恶意的PHP脚本), 继而构造这样的访问请求...

所以, 大家如果有用这种服务器搭配的, 请排查, 如果有隐患, **请关闭fix_pathinfo(默认是开启的)**.

详细漏洞信息, 请移步小顿的BLOG: 80Sec

**另: 我认为这个和Nginx没啥关系, 不属于Nginx的漏洞. 是配置的问题, 现在到处都在说是Nginx的Bug, 不妥不妥.**